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ABSTRACT
Adversarial training is one of the strongest defenses against adversarial attacks,
but it requires adversarial examples to be generated for every mini-batch during
optimization. The expense of producing these examples during training often pre-
cludes adversarial training from use on complex image datasets. In this study, we
explore the mechanisms by which adversarial training improves classifier robust-
ness, and show that these mechanisms can be effectively mimicked using simple
regularization methods, including label smoothing and logit squeezing. Remark-
ably, using these simple regularization methods in combination with Gaussian
noise injection, we are able to achieve strong adversarial robustness – often ex-
ceeding that of adversarial training – using no adversarial examples.
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have enjoyed great success in many areas of computer vision, such
as classification (Krizhevsky et al., 2012), object detection (Girshick, 2015), and face recognition
(Najibi et al., 2017). However, the existence of adversarial examples has raised concerns about the
security of computer vision systems (Szegedy et al., 2013; Biggio et al., 2013). For example, an
attacker may cause a system to mistake a stop sign for another object (Evtimov et al., 2017) or
mistake one person for another (Sharif et al., 2016). To address security concerns for high-stakes
applications, researchers are searching for ways to make models more robust to attacks.
Many defenses have been proposed to combat adversarial examples. Approaches such as feature
squeezing, denoising, and encoding (Xu et al., 2017; Samangouei et al., 2018; Shen et al., 2017;
Meng & Chen, 2017) have had some success at pre-processing images to remove adversarial pertur-
bations. Other approaches focus on hardening neural classifiers to reduce adversarial susceptibility.
This includes specialized non-linearities (Zantedeschi et al., 2017), modified training processes Pa-
pernot et al. (2016), and gradient obfuscation Athalye et al. (2018).
Despite all of these innovations, adversarial training (Goodfellow et al., 2014), one of the earliest
defenses, still remains among the most effective and popular strategies. In its simplest form, adver-
sarial training minimizes a loss function that measures performance of the model on both clean and
adversarial data as follows
minimize
θ
Ladv(θ) =
∑
i
κL(θ,xi,yi) + (1− κ)L(θ,xi,adv,yi), (1)
where L is a standard (cross entropy) loss function, (xi, yi) is an input image/label pair, θ contains
the classifier’s trainable parameters, κ is a hyper-parameter, and xi,adv is an adversarial example for
image x. Madry et al. (2017) pose adversarial training as a game between two players that similarly
requires computing adversarial examples on each iteration.
A key drawback to adversarial training methods is their computational cost; after every mini-batch
of training data is formed, a batch of adversarial examples must be produced. To train a network that
resists strong attacks, one needs to train with the strongest adversarial examples possible. For ex-
ample, networks hardened against the inexpensive Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM, Goodfellow
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et al. (2014)) can be broken by a simple two-stage attack (Trame`r et al., 2017). Current state-of-the-
art adversarial training results on MNIST and CIFAR-10 use expensive iterative adversaries (Madry
et al., 2017), such as the Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) method, or the closely related Basic
Iterative Method (BIM) (Kurakin et al., 2016). Adversarial training using strong attacks may be
10-100 times more time consuming than standard training methods. This prohibitive cost makes it
difficult to scale adversarial training to larger datasets and higher resolutions.
In this study, we show that it is possible to achieve strong robustness – comparable to or greater than
the robustness of adversarial training with a strong iterative attack – using fast optimization without
adversarial examples. We achieve this using standard regularization methods, such as label smooth-
ing (Warde-Farley & Goodfellow, 2016) and the more recently proposed logit squeezing (Kannan
et al., 2018). While it has been known for some time that these tricks can improve the robustness of
models, we observe that an aggressive application of these inexpensive tricks, combined with ran-
dom Gaussian noise, are enough to match or even surpass the performance of adversarial training
on some datasets. For example, using only label smoothing and augmentation with random Gaus-
sian noise, we produce a CIFAR-10 classifier that achieves over 73% accuracy against black-box
iterative attacks, compared to 64% for a state-of-the-art adversarially trained classifier (Madry et al.,
2017). In the white-box case, classifiers trained with logit squeezing and label smoothing get≈ 50%
accuracy on iterative attacks in comparison to≈ 47% for adversarial training. Regularized networks
without adversarial training are also more robust against non-iterative attacks, and more accurate on
non-adversarial examples.
Our goal is not just to demonstrate these defenses, but also to dig deep into what adversarial training
does, and how it compares to less expensive regularization-based defenses. We begin by dissecting
adversarial training, and examining ways in which it achieves robustness. We then discuss label
smoothing and logit squeezing regularizers, and how their effects compare to those of adversarial
training. We then turn our attention to random Gaussian data augmentation, and explore the impor-
tance of this technique for adversarial robustness. Finally, we combine the regularization methods
with random Gaussian augmentation, and experimentally compare the robustness achievable using
these simple methods to that achievable using adversarial training.
2 WHAT DOES ADVERSARIAL TRAINING DO?
Adversarial training injects adversarial examples into the training data as SGD runs. During training,
adversarial perturbations are applied to each training image to decrease the logit corresponding to
its correct class. The network must learn to produce logit representations that preserve the correct
labeling even when faced with such an attack. At first glance, it seems that adversarial training might
work by producing a large “logit gap,” i.e., by producing a logit for the true class that is much larger
than the logit of other classes. Surprisingly, adversarial training has the opposite effect – we will see
below that it decreases the logit gap. To better understand what adversarial training does, and how
we can replicate it, we now break down the different strategies for achieving robustness.
2.1 A SIMPLE LINEARIZED MODEL OF ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS
This section presents a simple metric for adversarial robustness that will help us understand adver-
sarial training. Consider an image x, and its logit representation z (i.e. pre-softmax activation)
produced by a neural network. Let zy denote the logit corresponding to the correct class y. If we
add a small perturbation δ to x, then the corresponding change in logits is approximately δT∇xzy
under a linear approximation, where∇xzy is the gradient of zy with respect to x.
Under a linearity assumption, we can calculate the step-size L needed to move an example from
class y to another class y¯. A classifier is susceptible to adversarial perturbation δ if the perturbed
logit of the true class is smaller than the perturbed logit of any other class:
zy + δ
T∇xzy < zy¯ + δT∇xzy¯. (2)
Assuming a one-step `∞ attack such as FGSM, the perturbation δ can be expressed as
δ = −L · sign(∇xzy −∇xzy¯), (3)
where L is the `∞-norm of the perturbation. Using this choice of δ, Equation 2 becomes
zy − zy¯ < −L · sign(∇xzy −∇xzy¯)T (∇xzy¯ −∇xzy) = L‖∇xzy −∇xzy¯‖1
2
description empirical FGSM Equation 4on X-ent on logits (CW)
MNIST naturally trained ( = 0.3) 7.05% 0.23% 0.0%
MNIST adv trained ( = 0.3) 95.25% 95.41% 56.73%
CIFAR10 naturally trained ( = 8(/255)) 13.33% 10.64% 0.0%
CIFAR10 adv trained ( = 8(/255)) 56.22% 55.57% 54.97%
Table 1: Experimental and predicted accuracy of classifiers for MNIST and CIFAR-10. The pre-
dicted accuracy is the percentage of images for which  < L. The empirical accuracy is the percent
of images that survive a perturbation of size . Attacks on both the cross-entropy (X-ent) and logits
as in Carlini & Wagner (2017) (CW) are presented.
where ‖ · ‖1 denotes the `1-norm of a vector. Therefore the smallest `∞-norm of the perturbation
required is the ratio of “logit gap” to “gradient gap”, i.e.,
L >
zy − zy¯
‖∇xzy −∇xzy¯‖1 . (4)
Equation 4 measures robustness by predicting the smallest perturbation size needed to switch the
class of an image. While the formula for L makes linearity assumptions, the approximation L
fairly accurately predicts the robustness of classifiers of the CIFAR-10 dataset (where perturbations
are small and linearity assumptions cause little distortion). It is also a good ballpark approximation
on MNIST, even after adversarial training (see Table 1).
Maximal robustness occurs when L is as large as possible. From equation 4, we observe 3 different
strategies for hardening a classifier:
• Increase the logit gap: Maximize the numerator of equation 4 by producing a classifier with
relatively large zy.
• Squash the adversarial gradients: Train a classifier that has small adversarial gradients ∇xzy¯
for any class y¯. In this case a large perturbation is needed to significantly change zy¯.
• Maximize gradient coherence: Produce adversarial gradients ∇xzy¯ that are highly correlated
with the gradient for the correct class ∇xzy. This will shrink the denominator of equation 4, and
produce robustness even if adversarial gradients are large. In this case, one cannot decrease zy
without also decreasing zy¯, and so large perturbations are needed to change the class label.
The most obvious strategy for achieving robustness is to increase the numerator in equation 4 while
fixing the denominator. Remarkably, our experimental investigation reveals that adversarial training
does not rely on this strategy at all, but rather it decreases the logit gap and gradient gap simultane-
ously. This can be observed in Figure 1, which shows distributions of logit gaps for naturally and
adversarially trained models on MNIST. Note that the cross entropy loss actually limits adversarial
training from increasing logit gaps. The accuracy of the classifier goes down in the presence of
adversarial examples, and so the cross entropy loss is minimized by smaller logit gaps that reflect
the lower level of certainty in the adversarial training environment.
Adversarial training succeeds by minimizing the denominator in Equation 4; it simultaneously
squeezes the logits and crushes the adversarial gradients. Figure 1 shows that the adversarial gradi-
ents shrink dramatically more than the logit gaps, and so the net effect is an increase in robustness.
If we closely examine the phenomenon of shrinking the logit gaps, we find that this shrink is due in
part to an overall shrink in the size of the logits themselves, (i.e., |zi| for any class i). To see this,
we plot histograms of the logits when classifiers are adversarially trained with strong adversaries1,
weak adversaries2, and with no adversarial examples. Figure 2 shows that adversarial training does
indeed squash the logits, although not enough to fully explain the decrease in |zy−zy¯| in Figure 1. 3
We have seen that adversarial training works by squashing adversarial gradients and slightly increas-
ing gradient coherence. But the fact that it cannot do this without decreasing the logit gap leads us
1MNIST: 40-step PGD with step-size 0.01 and =0.3. CIFAR-10: 7-step PGD with step-size 2 and  = 8.
2MNIST: 2-step PGD with step-size 0.2 and =0.3. CIFAR-10: 2-step PGD with step-size 5 and  = 8.
3Similar plots for the effect of adversarial training on CIFAR-10 are in Appendix A (Figure 6).
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Figure 1: The effect of adversarial training on the numerator and denominator for L on MNIST.
(left-top) The numerator of Equation 4 (i.e, the logit gap). (left-bottom) The denominator of Equa-
tion 4. (right-top) A histogram of values of L calculated by applying Equation 4 to test data.
(right-bottom) Cosine between the gradient vectors of the logits (i.e., gradient coherence).
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(a) MNIST logit distributions.
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(b) CIFAR10 logit distributions.
Figure 2: Adversarial training squishes the logits. Training on stronger adversaries squishes more.
to suspect that these quantities are inherently linked. This leads us to ask an important question: If
we directly decrease the logit gap, or the logits themselves, using an explicit regularization term,
will this have the desired effect of crushing the adversarial gradients?
3 EASY WAYS TO IMITATE ADVERSARIAL TRAINING: LABEL SMOOTHING &
LOGIT SQUEEZING
There are two approaches to replicating the effect on the logits produced by adversarial training.
The first is to replicate the decrease in logit gap seen in Figure 1. This can be achieved by label
smoothing. A second approach to replicating adversarial training is to just directly crush all logit
values and mimic the behavior in Figure 2. This approach is known as “logit squeezing,” and works
by adding a regularization term to the training objective that explicitly penalizes large logits.
Label smoothing Label smoothing converts “one-hot” label vectors into “one-warm” vectors that
represents a low-confidence classification. Because large logit gaps produce high-confidence clas-
sifications, label-smoothed training data forces the classifier to produce small logit gaps. Label
smoothing is a commonly used trick to prevent over-fitting on general classification problems, and it
4
was first observed to boost adversarial robustness by Warde-Farley & Goodfellow (2016), where it
was used as an inexpensive replacement for the network distillation defense (Papernot et al., 2016).
A one-hot label vector yhot is smoothed using the formula
ywarm = yhot − α× (yhot − 1
Nc
),
where α ∈ [0, 1] is the smoothing parameter, and Nc is the number of classes. If we pick α = 0
we get a hard decision vector with no smoothing, while α = 1 creates an ambiguous decision by
assigning equal certainty to all classes.
Logit squeezing A second approach to replicating adversarial training is to just directly crush all
logit values and mimic the behavior in Figure 2. This approach is known as “logit squeezing,” and
works by adding a regularization term to the training objective that explicitly penalizes large logits.
Kannan et al. (2018) were the first to introduce logit-squeezing as an alternative to a “logit pairing”
defense. Logit squeezing relies on the loss function
minimize
θ
∑
k
L(θ, Xk, Yk) + β||z(Xk)||F , (5)
where β is the squeezing parameter (i.e., coefficient for the logit-squeezing term) and ||.||F is the
Frobenius norm of the logits for the mini-batch.
Can such simple regularizers really replicate adversarial training? Our experimental results
suggest that simple regularizers can hurt adversarial robustness, which agrees with the findings
in Zantedeschi et al. (2017). However, these strategies become highly effective when combined with
a simple trick from the adversarial training literature — data augmentation with Gaussian noise.
4 GAUSSIAN NOISE SAVES THE DAY
Adding Gaussian noise to images during training (i.e, Gaussian noise augmentation) can be used
to improve the adversarial robustness of classifiers (Kannan et al., 2018; Zantedeschi et al., 2017).
However, the effect of Gaussian noise is not well understood (Kannan et al., 2018). Here, we take
a closer look at the behavior of Gaussian augmentation through systematic experimental investiga-
tions, and see that its effects are more complex than one might think.
4.1 GAUSSIAN NOISE SYNERGISTICALLY INTERACTS WITH REGULARIZERS
Label smoothing and logit squeezing become shockingly effective at hardening networks when they
are combined with Gaussian noise augmentation. From the robustness plots in Figure 3, we can see
that training with Gaussian noise alone produces a noticeable change in robustness, which seems
to be mostly attributable to a widening of the logit gap and slight decrease in the gradient gap
(‖∇xzy−∇xzy¯‖1). The small increase in robustness from random Gaussian augmentation was also
reported by Kannan et al. (2018). We also see that label smoothing alone causes a very slight drop
in robustness; the shrink in the gradient gap is completely offset by a collapse in the logit gap.
Surprisingly, Gaussian noise and label smoothing have a powerful synergistic effect. When used
together they cause a dramatic drop in the gradient gap, leading to a surge in robustness. A similar
effect happens in the case of logit squeezing, and results are shown in Appendix B (Figure 8).
4.2 GAUSSIAN NOISE HELPS REGULARIZATION PROPERTIES GENERALIZE “OFF THE
MANIFOLD”
Regularization methods have the potential to squash or align the adversarial gradients, but these
properties are only imposed during training on images from the manifold that the “true” data lies
on. At test time, the classifier sees adversarial images that do not “look like” training data because
they lie off of, but adjacent to, the image manifold. By training the classifier on images with random
perturbations, we teach the classifier to enforce the desired properties for input images that lie off
the manifold.
5
The generalization property of Gaussian augmentation seems to be independent from, and some-
times conflicting with, the synergistic properties discuss above. In our experiments below, we find
that smaller noise levels lead to a stronger synergistic effect, and yield larger L and better robust-
ness to FGSM attacks. However, larger noise levels enable the regularization properties to generalize
further off the manifold, resulting in better robustness to iterative attacks or attacks that escape the
flattened region by adding an initial random perturbation. See the results on MNIST in Table 2 and
the results on CIFAR-10 in Table 3 for various values of σ (standard deviation of Gaussian noise).
For more comprehensive experiments on the different parameters that contribute to the regularizers
see Table 6 for MNIST and Tables 7 & 8 in Appendices C & D.
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Figure 3: Label smoothing by itself worsens robustness. With the addition of Gaussian augmenta-
tion, robustness improves. This enhanced robustness results from both gradients getting squashed
and gradients becoming more aligned – two effects that shrink the denominator in Equation 4. Plots
use MNIST test samples with σ = 0.5 and α = 0.75. The y-axis of the logit gap is chopped at 30k.
4.3 WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LOGIT SQUEEZING AND LABEL SMOOTHING
Label smoothing (i.e. reducing the variance of the logits) is helpful because it causes the gradient gap
to decrease. The decreased gradient gap may be due to smaller element-wise gradient amplitudes,
the alignments of the adversarial gradients, or both. To investigate the causes, we plot the `1 norm
of the gradients of the logits with respect to the input image 4 and the cosine of the angle between
the gradients (Figure 4). We see that in label smoothing (with Gaussian augmentation), both the
gradient magnitude decreases and the gradients get more aligned. Larger smoothing parameters α
cause the gradient to be both smaller and more aligned.
When logit squeezing is used with Gaussian augmentation, the magnitudes of the gradients decrease.
The distribution of the cosines between gradients widens, but does not increase like it did for label
smoothing. These effects are very similar to the behavior of adversarial training in Figure 1. Inter-
estingly, in the case of logit squeezing with Gaussian noise, unlike label smoothing, the numerator of
Equation 4 increases as well. This increase in the logit gap disappears once we take away Gaussian
augmentation (See Appendix B Figure 8). Simultaneously increasing the numerator and decreasing
the denominator of Equation 4 potentially gives a slight advantage to logit squeezing.
4.4 MNIST RESULTS FOR VARIOUS DEFENSE PARAMETERS
There are multiple factors that can affect the robustness of the MNIST classifier 5. While regularizers
do not yield more robustness than adversarial training for MNIST, the results are promising given
4This plot is moved to the appendix due to space limitations. See Appendix B (Figure 7).
5Similar to other experiments, we use the same architecture and hyper-parameters of Madry et al. (2017)
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Figure 4: Label smoothing plus Gaussian augmentation works by decreasing the gradient gap. This
is done by both shrinking the gradients and aligning them. The effects get larger with the increase
in the smoothing parameter. Logit squeezing plus Gaussian noise works by increasing the logit gap
and decreasing the gradient gap. Increasing the squeezing parameter, strengthens these effects.
that these relatively high values of robustness come at a cheap cost in comparison to adversarial
training. In Table 2 we notice that as we increase the number of training iterations k, we get more
robust models for both logit squeezing and label smoothing 6. We get more robust models when we
use larger smoothing (α) and squeezing (β) parameters, and when Gaussian augmentation is used
with standard deviation σ that is greater than the desired  (the maximum perturbation size).
defense params White-box black-box
40-step PGD
α β σ k Train Test X-ent CW FGSM PGD
0 0.5 0.5 400k 99.96% 99.21% 72.44% 72.39% 87.58% 89.48%
0 2.0 0.0 400k 63.11% 64.14% 0.00% 0.00% 17.69% 24.52%
0 2.0 0.3 400k 99.99% 97.17% 76.08% 76.28% 82.11% 85.80%
0 2.0 0.5 400k 99.94% 99.21% 79.13% 78.36% 87.75% 89.47%
0 5.0 0.5 400k 99.84% 99.18% 78.21% 77.29% 87.73% 89.25%
0.2 0 0 400k 100.00% 99.36% 0.00% 0.00% 23.88% 29.33%
0.2 0 0.1 400k 100.00% 99.39% 15.59% 17.91% 59.14% 63.73%
0.2 0 0.3 400k 100.00% 99.40% 70.97% 73.71% 81.60% 85.38%
0.2 0 0.7 400k 99.76% 99.04% 66.34% 70.96% 87.27% 88.60%
0.95 0 0.3 100k 99.78% 99.38% 60.70% 61.93% 94.29% 77.21%
0.95 0 0.3 400k 99.99% 99.44% 74.02% 75.46% 93.97% 85.00%
0.95 0 0.3 2M 100.00% 99.25% 83.60% 85.39% 85.39% 87.22%
Madry et al. (2017) adv tr. 100% 98.8% 93.20% 93.9 % 96.08% 96.81%
Table 2: Accuracy of different MNIST classifiers against PGD and FGSM attacks on X-ent and CW
losses under the white-box and black-box threat models. Attacks have maximum `∞ perturbation
 = 0.3. The iterative white-box attacks have an initial random step. The naturally trained model is
used for generating black-box attacks. We use CW loss for the black-box attack.
6For comprehensive results with more sensitivity analysis on the parameters, see Table 6 in Appendix C.
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5 AGGRESSIVE LABEL SMOOTHING AND LOGIT SQUEEZING CAN
OUTPERFORM ADVERSARIAL TRAINING ON CIFAR-10
We trained Wide-Resnet CIFAR-10 classifiers (depth=28 and k=10 ) using aggressive values for
the smoothing and squeezing parameters on the CIFAR10 data set. Similar to Madry et al. (2017),
we use the standard data-augmentation techniques and weight-decay. We compare our results to
those of Madry et al. (2017). Note that the adversarially trained model from Madry et al. (2017)
has been trained for 80,000 iterations on adversaries which are generated using a 7-step PGD. Keep-
ing in mind that each step requires a forward and backward pass, the running time of training for
80,000 iterations on 7-step PDG examples is equivalent to 640,000 iterations of training with label
smoothing or logit squeezing. A short version of our results on white-box attacks are summarized in
Table 3. The results of some of our black-box experiments are summarized in Table 47. While logit
squeezing seems to outperform label smoothing in the white-box setting, label smoothing is slightly
better under the black-box threat.
We see that aggressive logit squeezing with squeezing parameter β = 10 and σ = 20 results in
a model that is more robust than the adversarially trained model from Madry et al. (2017) when
attacked with PGD-20. Interestingly, it also achieves higher test accuracy on clean examples.
defense params White-box
20-step PGD + Rand FGSM
α β σ k Train Test xent CW xent CW
0.95 0 20 160k 99.90% 92.88% 43.00% 41.29% 75.25% 74.51%
0.95 0 30 160k 99.64% 90.70% 53.93% 40.68% 64.77% 70.38%
0.95 0 30 240k 99.70% 90.55% 47.27% 37.25% 64.36% 69.44%
0.8 0 30 320k 99.72% 90.23% 43.51% 42.96% 74.68% 72.66%
0 10 20 160k 99.92% 92.68% 52.55% 48.78% 76.37% 75.79%
0 10 30 80k 99.45% 89.89% 48.46% 45.51% 68.19% 67.25%
0 10 30 160k 99.82% 90.49% 52.30% 49.73% 72.08% 71.08%
Madry et al. (2017) 100.00% 87.25% 45.84% 46.90% 56.22% 55.57%
Table 3: White-box attacks on CIFAR-10 models. We use `∞ attacks with  = 8. For the 20-step
PGD, similarly to Madry et al. (2017), we use an initial random perturbation. We do not use a
random perturbation for the FGSM attack since it decreased the attack’s effectiveness.
defense params Black-box
7-step PGD 7-step PGD + Rand FGSM
α β σ k xent CW xent CW xent CW
0.95 0 20 160k 71.58% 71.96% 72.44% 73.16% 74.01% 74.68%
0.95 0 30 160k 68.33% 68.88% 69.09% 69.63% 70.85% 71.71%
0.95 0 30 240k 67.88% 68.59% 68.84% 69.63% 70.53% 71.32%
0.8 0 30 320k 67.55% 68.32% 68.49% 69.28% 70.03% 70.89%
0 10 20 80k 70.27% 70.78% 71.29% 71.86% 72.47% 73.30%
0 10 20 160k 70.75% 71.49% 71.63% 72.22% 73.48% 73.82%
0 10 30 80k 66.53% 67.46% 67.52% 68.40% 69.30% 69.99%
0 10 30 160k 67.05% 67.79% 68.30% 68.89% 69.94% 70.61%
Madry et al. (2017) 63.39%* 64.38%* 63.39%* 64.38%* 67.00% 67.25%
Table 4: Black-box attacks on CIFAR-10 models. Attacks are `∞ with  = 8. Similar to Madry et al.
(2017), We build 7-step PGD attacks and FGSM attacks for a public adversarially trained model.
*Values taken from the original paper by Madry et al. (2017).
5.1 ATTACKING WITH STRONGER ADVERSARIES
Some defenses work by obfuscating gradients and masking the gradients. Athalye et al. (2018)
suggest these models can be identified by performing “sanity checks” such as attacking them with
7For more complete results see Table 7 and Table 8 in Appendix D.
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Figure 5: The cross-entropy landscape of the first eight images of the validation set for the model
trained for 160k iterations with hyper-parameters β = 10 and σ = 30. To plot the loss landscape we
take two random directions r1 and r2 (i.e. r1, r2 ∼ Rademacher(0.5) ). We plot the cross-entropy
(i.e. xent) loss at different points x = xi + 1 · r1 + 2 · r2. Where xi is the cletan image and
−10 ≤ 1, 2 ≤ 10.
unbounded strong adversaries (i.e. unbounded  with many iterations). By attacking our robust
models using these unbounded attacks, we verify that the unbounded adversary can degrade the
accuracy to 0.00% which implies that the adversarial example generation optimization attack (PGD)
is working properly. Also, it is known that models which do not completely break the PGD attack
(such as us) can possibly lead to a false sense of security by creating a loss landscape that prevents
an -bounded but weak adversary from finding strong adversarial examples. This can be done by
convoluting the loss landscape such that many local-optimal points exist. This false sense of security
can be identified by increasing the strength of the adversary using methods such as increasing the
number of steps and random restarts of the PGD attack. We run the stronger PGD attacks on a
sample model from Table 3 with hyper-parameters k = 160k, β = 10, and σ = 30. We notice that
performing 9 random restarts for the PGD attack on the cross-entropy loss only drops the accuracy
slightly to 49.86%. Increasing the number of PGD steps to 1000 decreases the accuracy slightly
more to 40.94% 8. While for such strong iterative white-box attacks our sample model is less robust
than the adversarially trained model, there are other areas where this hardened model is superior to
the adversarially trained model: Very high robustness in the black box setting (roughly 3% higher
than that for adversarial training according to Table 4) and against white-box non-iterative (or less
iterative) attacks (roughly 15%); high test accuracy on clean data (roughly 3%); and, very fast
training time compared to adversarial training.
5.2 THE LOSS LANDSCAPE OF A LOGIT-SQUEEZED MODEL FOR CIFAR-10
To further verify that our robust model is not falsely creating a sense of robustness by “breaking” the
optimization problem that generates adversarial examples by either masking the gradients or making
the loss landscape convoluted, we visualize the loss landscape of our sample model from Table 3.
We plot the classification (e.g., cross-entropy) loss for points surrounding the first eight validation
images that belong to the subspace spanned by two random directions9 in Figure 5. It seems that the
loss landscape has not become convoluted. This observation is backed up by the fact that increasing
the number of PGD attack steps does not substantially affect accuracy.
8See Table 10 and Table 11 in the appendix for more complete results.
9See Figure 9 in Appendix I for the xent loss landscape along the adversarial and random directions.
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6 HARDENING CIFAR-100 CLASSIFIERS WITH AGGRESSIVE LOGIT
SQUEEZING
To check the performance of our proposed regularizers on more complicated datasets with more
number of classes, we perform aggressive logit squeezing on the CIFAR-100 dataset which contains
100 categories. We use the same architecture and settings used for training the CIFAR-10 classifiers.
The white-box performance of two hardened models with logit squeezing and a PGD adversarially
trained model for the same architecture are summarized in Table 5.
defense params White-box
α β σ k Train Test PGD-7 PGD-20 PGD-100 PGD-200
0 5 20 80k 98.99% 69.80% 30.68% 22.91% 18.69% 18.09%
0 5 20 160k 99.42% 70.21% 37.08% 30.91% 26.47% 26.00%
PGD-2 adv trained 99.96% 67.94% 20.08% 17.08% 16.49% 16.50%
Table 5: White-box iterative attacks on CIFAR-100 models. We use `∞ attacks with  = 8. For
brevity, we only report the results for attacking the cross-entropy loss. We attack the models with
adversaries having different strengths by varying the number of PGD steps.
Similar to CIFAR-10, aggressive logit squeezing can result in models as robust as those that are
adversarially trained at a fraction of the cost. The logit-squeezed model that is trained for only 80k
iterations achieves high classification accuracy for natural/clean examples. It is also more robust
against white-box PGD attacks compared to the adversarially trained model that requires much
more training time. The logit-squeezed model with k = 160k improves the robustness and clean
accuracy even further and still trains faster than the adversarially trained model (28.8 hours vs 34.3
hours).
7 CONCLUSION
We studied the robustness of adversarial training, label smoothing, and logit squeezing through a
linear approximation L that relates the magnitude of adversarial perturbations to the logit gap and
the difference between the adversarial directions for different labels. Using this simple model, we
observe how adversarial training achieves robustness and try to imitate this robustness using label
smoothing and logit squeezing. The resulting methods perform well on MNIST, and can get results
on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 that can excel over adversarial training in both robustness and accu-
racy on clean examples. By demonstrating the effectiveness of these simple regularization methods,
we hope this work can help make robust training easier and more accessible to practitioners.
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Appendix: Label Smoothing and Logit Squeezing: A Replacement
for Adversarial Training?
A ADVERSARIAL TRAINING EFFECTS ON CIFAR-10
Similarly to what we observed about adversarial training on MNIST, adversarial training on CIFAR-
10 works by greatly shrinking the adversarial gradients and also shrinking the logit gaps. The shrink
in the gradients is much more dramatic than the shrink in the logit gap, and overwhelms the decrease
in the numerator of Equation 4. See Figure 6.
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Figure 6: The effect of adversarial training on the numerator and denominator of the expression
for L on CIFAR-10. (left-top) The numerator of Equation 4 (i.e, the logit gap). (left-bottom)
The denominator of Equation 4. (right-top) A histogram of values of L calculated by applying
Equation 4 to test data. (right-bottom) Cosine between the gradient vectors of the logits (i.e., gradient
coherence).
B THE MAGIC OF GAUSSIAN AUGMENTATION PLUS LOGIT SQUEEZING
As shown empirically in Table 6, and analytically using the linear approximation in Equation 4
evaluated in Figure 8, logit squeezing worsens robustness when Gaussian augmentation is not used.
However, when fused with Gaussian augmentation, logit squeezing achieves good levels of robust-
ness. This addition of Gaussian augmentation has three observed effects: the gradients get squashed,
the logit gap increases, and the gradients get slightly more aligned. The increase in the logit gaps
increases the numerator in Equation 4. This gives a slight edge to logit squeezing in comparison to
label smoothing, that mostly works by decreasing the denominator in Equation 4.
C FULL RESULTS ON MNIST
The results for all of our experiments on MNIST are summarized in Table 6. As can be seen,
Gaussian random augmentation by itself (β = α = 0) is effective in increasing robustness on
black-box attacks. It does not, however, significantly increase robustness on white-box attacks.
Models that are only trained with either logit squeezing or label smoothing without random Gaussian
augmentation (σ = 0), can be fooled by an adversary that has knowledge of the model parameters
(white-box) with accuracy 100%. In the black-box setting, they are also not robust.
Increasing the magnitude of the noise (σ) generally increases robustness but degrades the perfor-
mance on the clean examples. Keeping the number of iterations k constant, for extremely large σ
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Figure 7: Label smoothing decreases the difference between the adversarial gradients (the denomi-
nator of Equation 4) by shrinking the gradient magnitudes. The gradients magnitudes are depicted
here using a histogram.
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Figure 8: Random Gaussian augmentation helps logit squeezing. Graphs are for MNIST test exam-
ples with σ = 0.5 and β = 0.5.
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values, the robustness also starts to drop. At the expense of extra computations k, the robustness and
the accuracy on clean examples improves.
defense params White-box black-box
40-step PGD
α β σ k Train Test X-ent CW FGSM PGD
0 0 0.5 100k 99.89% 98.97% 5.18% 1.95% 84.23% 86.21%
0 0 0.3 400k 99.97% 99.07% 3.27% 0.83% 79.36% 81.61%
0 0 0.5 400k 99.99% 99.09% 11.24% 17.52% 87.28% 89.44%
0 0.5 0.5 100k 99.83% 99.06% 57.57% 55.77% 85.91% 87.48%
0 0.5 0.5 400k 99.96% 99.21% 72.44% 72.39% 87.58% 89.48%
0 2.0 0.0 400k 63.11% 64.14% 0.00% 0.00% 17.69% 24.52%
0 2.0 0.3 400k 99.99% 97.17% 76.08% 76.28% 82.11% 85.80%
0 2.0 0.5 100k 99.69% 99.05% 67.93% 66.38% 85.09% 86.29%
0 2.0 0.5 400k 99.94% 99.21% 79.13% 78.36% 87.75% 89.47%
0 5.0 0.5 100k 99.27% 99.02% 65.53% 62.00% 85.53% 86.64%
0 5.0 0.5 400k 99.84% 99.18% 78.21% 77.29% 87.73% 89.25%
0 10.0 0.5 100k 74.16% 75.76% 3.15% 2.43% 57.35% 61.55%
0 10.0 0.5 400k 13.27% 12.93% 9.40% 8.88% 10.60% 11.00%
0 0 0.3 400k 100.00% 99.42% 2.90% 1.06% 78.67% 80.67%
0 0 0.5 400k 100.00% 99.23% 11.75% 19.64% 87.57% 89.71%
0 0 0.7 400k 99.90% 99.08% 13.68% 22.95% 87.53% 89.14%
0 0 1.0 400k 98.66% 98.17% 1.85% 9.33% 82.19% 83.09%
0.2 0 0 400k 100.00% 99.36% 0.00% 0.00% 23.88% 29.33%
0.2 0 0.1 400k 100.00% 99.39% 15.59% 17.91% 59.14% 63.73%
0.2 0 0.2 400k 100.00% 99.41% 55.50% 56.63% 69.40% 76.46%
0.2 0 0.3 400k 100.00% 99.40% 70.97% 73.71% 81.60% 85.38%
0.2 0 0.4 400k 100.00% 99.33% 76.86% 80.07% 86.71% 88.75%
0.2 0 0.5 400k 99.99% 99.20% 76.81% 79.55% 87.79% 89.50%
0.2 0 0.6 400k 99.92% 99.16% 74.28% 75.19% 87.87% 89.43%
0.2 0 0.7 400k 99.76% 99.04% 66.34% 70.96% 87.27% 88.60%
0.5 0 0.3 400k 100.00% 99.36% 74.61% 75.10% 81.66% 86.26%
0.5 0 0.5 400k 99.97% 99.29% 79.12% 79.24% 87.32% 89.28%
0.5 0 0.7 400k 99.63% 98.90% 70.17% 70.16% 86.85% 87.49%
0.75 0 0 400k 100.00% 99.37% 0.00% 0.00% 15.85% 21.26%
0.75 0 0.3 400k 100.00% 99.41% 75.21% 75.62% 79.91% 84.10%
0.75 0 0.5 400k 99.90% 99.23% 78.35% 79.60% 87.20% 88.83%
0.75 0 0.7 400k 99.44% 98.71% 70.11% 69.95% 86.97% 87.99%
0.95 0 0 400k 100.00% 99.21% 0.00% 0.00% 16.76% 19.81%
0.95 0 0.3 100k 99.78% 99.38% 60.70% 61.93% 94.29% 77.21%
0.95 0 0.3 400k 99.99% 99.44% 74.02% 75.46% 93.97% 85.00%
0.95 0 0.3 2M 100.00% 99.25% 83.60% 85.39% 85.39% 87.22%
0.95 0 0.5 100k 99.20% 99.01% 61.95% 60.80% 84.83% 86.02%
0.95 0 0.5 400k 99.82% 99.23% 74.15% 73.19% 86.72% 87.87%
0.95 0 0.5 2M 99.93% 98.98% 77.92% 82.05% 87.33% 88.78%
Madry et al. (2017) adv tr. 100% 98.8% 93.20% 93.9 % 96.08% 96.81%
Table 6: Accuracy of different models trained on MNIST with a 40 step PGD attack on the cross-
entropy (X-ent) loss and the Carlini-Wagner (CW) loss under the white-box and black-box threat
models. Attacks are `∞ attacks with a maximum perturbation of  = 0.3. The iterative white-box
attacks have an initial random step. The naturally trained model was used for generating the attacks
for the black-box threat model. We use the CW loss for the FGSM attack in the blackbox case. k is
the number of training iterations.
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D COMPLETE RESULTS ON CIFAR-10
Here we take a deeper look at reguarlized training results for CIFAR-10. The conclusions that can
be drawn in this case are parallel with those of MNIST discussed in Appendix C. It is worth noting
that while the results of logit squeezing outperform those from label smoothing in the white-box
setting, training with large squeezing coefficient β often fails and results in low accuracy on test
data. This breakdown of training rarely happens for label smoothing (even for very large smoothing
parameters α).
defense params White-box
20-step PGD FGSM
α β σ k Train Test xent CW xent CW
0.2 0 20 80k 99.88% 92.94% 31.27% 32.16% 75.10% 69.88%
0.2 0 30 80k 99.67% 91.08% 38.26% 39.26% 71.93% 67.30%
0.2 0 40 80k 98.99% 87.97% 37.12% 36.28% 67.22% 62.01%
0.5 0 20 80k 99.85% 92.57% 31.37% 32.55% 75.76% 73.45%
0.5 0 30 80k 99.50% 90.82% 38.30% 39.46% 72.83% 71.32%
0.9 0 30 80k 99.30% 90.59% 33.89% 33.21% 2.04% 1.11%
0.2 0 30 160k 99.72% 90.64% 37.67% 39.60% 76.07% 69.48%
0.5 0 30 160k 99.70% 90.58% 40.22% 39.96% 74.50% 71.55%
0.8 0 30 160k 99.73% 90.83% 39.20% 37.73% 74.29% 72.81%
0.95 0 20 160k 99.90% 92.88% 43.00% 41.29% 75.25% 74.51%
0.95 0 30 160k 99.64% 90.70% 53.93% 40.68% 64.77% 70.38%
0.95 0 40 160k 98.94% 87.81% 49.23% 35.93% 61.42% 64.95%
0.95 0 30 240k 99.70% 90.55% 47.27% 37.25% 64.36% 69.44%
0.8 0 30 320k 99.72% 90.23% 43.51% 42.96% 74.68% 72.66%
0.95 0 40 320k 94.10% 86.12% 46.82% 19.27% 55.11% 45.48%
0 10 20 80k 99.77% 92.16% 45.46% 41.39% 72.28% 71.42%
0 10 20 160k 99.92% 92.68% 52.55% 48.78% 76.37% 75.79%
0 10 30 80k 99.45% 89.89% 48.46% 45.51% 68.19% 67.25%
0 10 30 160k 99.82% 90.49% 52.30% 49.73% 72.08% 71.08%
Madry et al. (2017) 100.00% 87.25% 45.84% 46.90% 56.22% 55.57%
Table 7: White-box attacks on the CIFAR-10 models. All attacks are `∞ attacks with  = 8. For the
20-step PGD, similar to Madry et al. (2017), we use an initial random perturbation.
E OTHER METRICS OF SIMILARITY BETWEEN ADVERSARIAL TRAINING,
LOGIT SQUEEZING, AND LABEL SMOOTHING
While it seems that logit squeezing, label smoothing, and adversarial training have a lot in common
when we look at quantities affecting the linear approximation L, we wonder whether they still
look similar with respect to other metrics. Here, we look at the sum of the activations in the logit
layer for every logit (Figure 11) and the sum of activations for every neuron of the penultimate layer
(Figure 10). The penultimate activations are often seen as the “feature representation” that the neural
network learns. By summing over the absolute value of the activations of all test examples for every
neuron in the penultimate layer, we can identify how many of the neurons are effectively inactive.
When we perform natural training, all neurons become active for at least some images. After adver-
sarial training, this is no longer the case. Adversarial training is causing the effective dimensionality
of the deep feature representation layer to decrease. One can interpret this as adversarial training
learning to ignore features that the adversary can exploit ( 400 out of the 1024 neurons of the penul-
timate layer are deactivated). Shockingly, both label smoothing and logit squeezing do the same –
they deactivate roughly 400 neurons from the deep feature representation layer.
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defense params Black-box
7-step PGD 7-step PGD+Rand FGSM
α β σ k xent CW xent CW xent CW
0.2 0 20 80k 71.74% 72.44% 72.89% 73.73% 74.51% 74.99%
0.2 0 30 80k 67.53% 68.26% 68.46% 69.32% 70.51% 71.36%
0.2 0 40 80k 64.39% 65.42% 65.34% 62.01% 67.13% 68.01%
0.5 0 20 80k 71.17% 71.88% 72.45% 72.93% 74.00% 74.65%
0.5 0 30 80k 67.31% 68.25% 68.36% 69.44% 70.32% 70.96%
0.9 0 30 80k 10.07% 10.08% 10.08% 10.02% 10.07% 10.04%
0.2 0 30 160k 67.83% 68.72% 68.73% 69.48% 70.66% 71.43%
0.5 0 30 160k 67.91% 68.74% 68.77% 69.89% 70.51% 71.37%
0.8 0 30 160k 67.85% 68.86% 68.88% 69.69% 70.51% 71.29%
0.95 0 20 160k 71.58% 71.96% 72.44% 73.16% 74.01% 74.68%
0.95 0 30 160k 68.33% 68.88% 69.09% 69.63% 70.85% 71.71%
0.95 0 40 160k 63.99% 64.80% 65.13% 65.83% 66.98% 67.91%
0.95 0 30 240k 67.88% 68.59% 68.84% 69.63% 70.53% 71.32%
0.8 0 30 320k 67.55% 68.32% 68.49% 69.28% 70.03% 70.89%
0.95 0 40 320k 64.20% 65.01% 64.90% 65.91% 66.83% 67.66%
0 10 20 80k 70.27% 70.78% 71.29% 71.86% 72.47% 73.30%
0 10 20 160k 70.75% 71.49% 71.63% 72.22% 73.48% 73.82%
0 10 30 80k 66.53% 67.46% 67.52% 68.40% 69.30% 69.99%
0 10 30 160k 67.05% 67.79% 68.30% 68.89% 69.94% 70.61%
Madry et al. (2017) 63.39%* 64.38%* 63.39%* 64.38%* 67.00% 67.25%
Table 8: Black-box attacks on the CIFAR-10 models. All attacks are `∞ attacks with  = 8. Similar
to Madry et al. (2017), We build 7-step PGD attacks and FGSM attacks for the public adversarial
trained model of MadryLab. We then use the built attacks for attacking the different models. *:
Since we do not have the Madry model, we cannot evaluate it under the PGD attack with and
without random initialization and therefore we use the same value that is reported by them for both.
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F IS OUR LOGIT-SQUEEZED MODEL GIVING A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY BY
BREAKING THE PGD ATTACK?
As a sanity check, and to verify that the robustness of our models are not due to degrading the
functionality of PGD attacks, here we verify that our models indeed have zero accuracy when the
adversary is allowed to make huge perturbations. In Table 9 by performing an unbounded PGD
attack on a sample logit-squeezed model for the CIFAR-10 (β = 10, σ = 30, and k = 160k), we
verify that our attack is not benefiting from obfuscating the gradients.
PGD steps step-size  accuracy
30 2 50 14.48%
40 2 60 9.02%
50 3 100 2.07%
50 4 150 0.22%
100 4 150 0.13%
200 2 255 0.00%
Table 9: The effect of unbounded  on the accuracy. The decline in the accuracy as a sanity check
shows that the sample model is at least not completely breaking the PGD attack and is not obfuscat-
ing the gradients.
G STRONGER ADVERSARIES: MULTIPLE RANDOM RESTARTS
We attack our sample hardened CIFAR-10 model (β = 10, Gaussian augmentation σ = 30 model,
and k = 160k iterations), by performing many random restarts. Random restarts can potentially
increase the strength of the PGD attack that has a random initialization. As shown in Table 10,
increasing the number of random restarts does not significantly degrade the robustness. It should
be noted that attacking with more iterations and more random restarts hurts adversarially trained
models as well (see the leaderboard in Madry’s Cifar10 Github Repository).
No of Random Restarts Accuracy
1 52.3%
2 50.84%
3 50.43%
4 50.24%
5 50.21%
6 50.13%
7 50.04%
8 49.86%
9 49.86%
Table 10: The effect of the number of random restarts while generating the adversarial examples on
the accuracy of a model trained with the logit squeezing. It shows that the accuracy plateaus at 9
random restarts.
H STRONGER ADVERSARIES: INCREASING THE NUMBER OF PGD STEPS
Another way to increase the strength of an adversary is by increasing the number of PGD steps for
the attack. We notice that increasing the number of steps does not greatly affect the robustness of
our sample logit-squeezed model (See Table 11).
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Number of PGD steps Accuracy
20 49.73%
40 45.33%
100 42.36%
400 41.58%
1000 40.94%
Table 11: The effect of the number of steps of the white-box PGD attack on the CW loss (worst case
based on Table 3) for the model trained in 160k steps with logit squeezing parameters β = 10 and
σ = 30 on CIFAR-10 dataset. The model remains resistant against `∞ attacks with  = 8
Figure 9: The cross-entropy landscape of the first eight images of the validation set for the model
trained for 160k iteration and hyper-parameters β = 10 and σ = 30. To plot the loss landscape
we take walks in one random direction r1 ∼ Rademacher(0.5) and the adversarial direction a2 =
sign(∇xxent) where xent is the cross-entropy loss. We plot the cross-entropy (i.e. xent) loss at
different points x = xi + 1 · r1 + 2 · a2. Where xi is the clean image and −10 ≤ 1, 2 ≤ 10. As
it can be seen moving along the adversarial direction changes the loss value a lot and moving along
the random direction does not make any significant major changes.
I THE LOSS LANDSCAPE OF THE LOGIT-SQUEEZED MODEL BY MOVING IN
AN ADVERSARIAL DIRECTION
Similar to Figure 5, we plot the classification loss landscape surrounding the input images for the
first eight images of the validation set. Unlike in Figure 5 which we changed the clean image along
two random directions, in Figure 9, we wander around the clean image by moving in the adversarial
direction and one random direction. From Figure 9 we observe that the true direction that the
classification loss changes is along the adversarial direction which illustrates that the logit-squeezed
model is not masking the gradients.
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Figure 10: For MNIST, we plot the cumulative magnitude of activations for all neurons in feature
layer of a network produced by natural training, adversarial training, natural training with random
noise, label smoothing (α = 0.2) with random noise, and logit squeezing (β = 0.5) with random
noise. In all cases, the noise is Gaussian with σ = 0.5. Interestingly, the combination of Gaussian
noise and label smoothing, similar to the combination of Gaussian noise and logit squeezing, deac-
tivates roughly 400 neurons. This is similar to adversarial training. In some sense it seems that all
three methods are causing the “effective” dimensionality of the deep feature representation layer to
shrink.
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Figure 11: For MNIST, we plot the cumulative sum of activation magnitudes for all neurons in logit
layer of a network produced by natural training, adversarial training, natural training with random
noise, label smoothing (LS = 0.2) with random noise, and logit squeezing (β = 0.5) with random
noise. In all cases, the noise is Gaussian with σ = 0.5.
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